Despite the benefits of EHRs (Electronic Health Records), there is a growing concern over the risks of privacy exposure associated with the technologies of EHR storing and transmission. To deal with this problem, a timeaware searchable encryption with designated server is proposed in this paper. It is based on Boneh's public key encryption with keyword search and Rivest's timed-release cryptology. Our construction has three features: the user cannot issue a keyword search query successfully unless the search falls into the specific time range; only the authorized user can generate a valid trapdoor; only the designated server can execute the search. Applying our scheme in a multi-user environment, the number of the keyword ciphertexts would not increase linearly with the number of the authorized users. The security and performance analysis shows that our proposed scheme is securer and more efficient than the existing similar schemes.
Introduction
Electronic Health Records (EHRs) have been widely adopted to promote the operational efficiency of hospitals [1] nowadays. This practice also brings great benefits to patients. For instance, it enables them to ask for support and advice from their physicians remotely via home computers or mobile devices rather than going to the clinics or hospitals in person in every occasion. Moreover, the advances in information and communication technologies make intelligent healthcare possible. For example, making use of the mass health records stored in many hospitals as input to an analysis system, doctors can find out the inner principals of certain diseases, which are critical for their treatment. In recent years, as many hospitals are equipped with more advanced clinical instruments and computer aided devices, a huge amount of data will be generated and need to be stored and maintained, which would form a heavy burden to the IT support department of these hospitals. As a result, many hospitals are apt to outsource the data storage and maintenance tasks to a third party, such as cloud providers [2, 3] . Therefore, there have been wide concerns over the issue of privacy exposure as the EHRs could be exposed to those third party servers and even to unauthorized parties [4] . Encryption is a common method to prevent the exposure of personal health records [5, 6] , and sensible records could be encrypted with certain encryption algorithm before outsourcing. However, the retrieval of encrypted records remains to be a challenge to those schemes, because the health records could be retrieved by other authorized systems and users. To achieve a tradeoff bewteen the confidentiality and the availability, the searchable public key encryption can be considered as a practical solution for this problem.
Public key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS), proposed by Boneh et al. [8] , is a sheme that allows one to search a document containing a particular keyword by providing a trapdoor, while other parties cannot learn anything except for the trapdoor. In this scheme, a secure channel between the client and the server must be established to deliver the trapdoor in its security model, which is very impractical because building such a secure channel is quiet expensive. In 2008, Baek et al. [9] presented a new PEKS scheme with a designated server (dPEKS), in which the requirement of a secure channel was removed. To prevent the keyword-guessing attacks in the dPEKS schemes, Hyun et al. [12] investigated the security model for dPEKS and introduced the concept of trapdoor indistinguishability. Similar proposals appeared in Refs. [13] [14] [15] .
dPEKS schemes are suitable for EHRs, because the personal health records are private and need to be protected, meanwhile they might be used by different systems and physicians, and even might be outsourced to third parties. Actually, not all patients' records have the same requirements for privacy. Although some personal health records are confidential and strictly constrained in usage at present, they might be legally shared and retrieved by authorized servers and users in the future. A dPEKS scheme can perform search at a specified time in the future other than at present, thus is suitable for such a scenario. It's a pity that there is no similar dPEKS scheme with this feature by now. Since the search on encrypted health records are restricted to specific servers at a specific time, the combination of dPEKS and timed-release would be a promising solution. The concept of timed-release was first proposed by May in 1993 [16] , and a detailed discussion was made by Rivest et al. in 1996 [17] . It is an encrypt mechanism that only after the specific time T can the user decrypt the encrypted data. Some applications of the timed-release encryption were discussed in Refs. [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] .
In this paper, we concentrate on constructing a Time-aware dPEKS scheme (T-dPEKS), which can perform search at a specified time in the future by authorized servers. As far as we know, there is no similar dPEKS scheme for EHRs up to now.
Our proposed scheme is multi-user setting oriented, in which each health record owner firstly encrypts his or her sensitive health records using certain encryption algorithm, then encrypts the corresponding keywords for the records, and then uploads the encrypted content to the storage center, such as a medical cloud. When a record owner encrypts his or her record, he/she can assign which user can retrieve and which server can search these encrypted records. Meanwhile, the owner will also specify a specific time T so that only after this specific time can the encrypted health records be properly retrieved and decrypted by a record user. The detailed procedure can be found in Fig. 1 , where health records owners are, S 1 ; S 2 are servers to perform the search, and U 1 ; U 2 ; U 3 are health records users. Assume T 1 is the system time in this scenario, only U 1 can successfully get the encrypted records R 1 , which contains the keyword K 1 . And U 1 can decrypt the encrypted records from S 1 with K 1 , which is pre-allocated. In this way, the privacy of health records can be preserved effectively.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: firstly, we provide some mathematical preliminaries in Section 2; then we define T-dPEKS and its security model in Section 3. Then, the concrete construction of the proposed scheme is illustrated in Section 4. Subsequently, the security analysis and comparison are presented in Section 5. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 6.
Preliminaries
As our scheme is based on the bilinear parings, this section presents a brief review on the related basic knowledge about bilinear parings.
Bilinear parings
Assume G 1 and G 2 are two multiplicative cyclic groups with the same prime order p, then a bilinear pairing e : G 1 Â G 1 → G 2 is defined under the following conditions:
1. Bilinearity: For all P; Q 2 G 1 and a; b 2 Z Ã p , eðaP; bQÞ ¼ eðP; QÞ ab . 2. Non-degeneracy: There exist P; Q 2 G 1 , such that eðP; QÞ 6 ¼ 1. 3. Computability: For all P;Q 2 G 1 , there exists an efficient algorithm to compute eðP; QÞ.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem(BDH)
Let g be a generator of G 1 . The BDH problem is defined as follows:
Given g; g a ; g b ; g c 2 G 1 as input, compute eðg; gÞ abc 2 G 2 . BDH is called intractable if all polynomial time algorithms can solve the BDH problem with a negligible advantage.
Hash Diffie-Hellman assumption(HDH)
Let g be a generator of G 1 , let L h be a security number and H : f0; 1g Ã → f0; 1g Lh be a Hash Function. The HDH problem in G 1 is defined as follows: given g; g a ; g b ; Hðg c Þ as input, output "yes" if a Á b ¼ c, and "no" otherwise. An algorithm A that outputs b' 2 f0; 1g has an advantage ε in solving the HDH problem in
We say that the HDH assumption holds in G 1 if no t-time algorithm has an advantage at least ε in solving the HDH problem in G 1 .
Security definition
This section gives the model of T-dPEKS and its security definitions. 
Definition of T-dPEKS
A T-dPEKS is a tuple of algorithms as follows: À SetupðλÞ; server KeyGen ðparamÞ; user KeyGen ðparamÞ; T À dPEKS À param; pk uj ; w; pk s ; T Á ;
Trapdoorðparam; sk ui ; w; pk s Þ; TestðC; sk s ; T w ; TÞ Á . SetupðλÞ: Input a security parameter λ, and output the global parameter set param. server KeyGen ðparamÞ: Input the system global parameters param, and output the public key and private key ðpk s ; sk s Þ for server S. user KeyGen ðparamÞ: Input the system global parameters param, and output the public key and private key ðpk ui ; sk ui Þ for user U i .
T À dPEKS À param; pk uj ; w; pk s ; T Á : Input the system global parameters param, the public keys of the authorized users pk uj ðj ¼ 1; :::; nÞ, the keyword w, the specific time T, and the public key of the designated server pk s ; and output an encryption C of the keyword w.
Trapdoorðparam; sk ui ; w; pk s Þ: Input the global parameters param, the private key of user i, the public key of the designated server pk s , and the keyword w; and output a search trapdoor T w .
TestðC; sk s ; T w ; TÞ: Input the ciphertext C, the private key of the designated server sk s and a search trapdoor T w ; then it outputs 'yes' if w ¼ w', and 'no' otherwise, where C ¼ T À dPEKS À param; pk uj ; w'; pk s ; T Á .
Security of T-dPEKS ciphertext
We need to ensure that the trapdoor C ¼ T À dPEKS À param; pk uj ; w; pk s ; T Á will leak nothing about w unless T w is available. Next we will define the security against an adversary who is capable of getting T w for any keyword w he/she wants. That is the adversary who cannot distinguish the ciphertext of the keyword w 0 and keyword w 1 without the trapdoors of both keywords. The security model is based on the security model proposed and defined by Boneh et al. [8] by using a game as follows:
Definition (1). Ciphertext Indistinguishability Game.
Given the security parameter λ and the public parameter param, a challenger B and an adversary A can interact by using the following game:
Setup: Challenger B runs the SetupðλÞ algorithm to generate the global parameters param and the public keys of the authorized users pk uj , where ðj ¼ 1; :::; nÞ, and then sends these values to adversary A.
Trapdoor query: Adversary A can adaptively ask the challenger for the trapdoor T w of any keyword w 2 f0; 1g Ã for user j.
Challenge step: Adversary A chooses between w 0 ; w 1 , which he/she wishes to challenge firstly, and then challenger B picks w b randomly, where b 2 f0; 1g, and sends T À dPEKS À param; pk uj ; w b ; pk s ; T Á to A. The constraint is: T w0 and T w1 haven't been queried before. More trapdoor queries: Adversary A can adaptively ask the challenger for the trapdoor T w for any keyword w 2 f0; 1g Ã for user j.
The restriction is: The keyword w should not be w 0 or w 1 . Adversary A outputs b' as a guess for b. If b ¼ b', the adversary wins the game. The advantage of A in breaking the scheme is defined as follows:
Definition (2) . A T-dPEKS scheme is against an adaptive chosen keyword attack if and only if for any polynomial-time attacker A, its advantage Adv indÀcpa TÀdpeks;A ðλÞ is negligible.
Security of trapdoor
The indistinguishability of the trapdoor requires that an adversary cannot learn anything about the keywords to be searched.
Definition (1) . Trapdoor Indistinguishability Game.
The game is defined between a challenger B 1 and an adversary A 1 on security parameter λ and public parameter param. It includes the following stages:
Setup: B 1 firstly generates the global parameters param and sends them to the adversary, and then B 1 generates the public and private keys for the authorized users and the public key for the designated server pk s .
Trapdoor queries: A 1 can adaptively make the trapdoor queries of keyword w i for user j, and w i can be any keyword w i 2 f0; 1g Ã .
Challenge: A 1 chooses between two words w 0 and w 1 , which he/she wants to challenge. B 1 chooses a random b' 2 f0; 1g and computes the trapdoor T wb' and responds it to A 1 .
Trapdoor query: A 1 can continue to adaptively make the trapdoor queries of w i for user U j .
Restriction: w i should not be w 0 or w 1 .
Output: A 1 outputs its guessb 2 f0; 1g for b', if b' ¼b, the adversary wins the game.
The advantage of A 1 in breaking the trapdoor indistinguishability game in the scheme is defined as follows:
Concrete construction
In our scheme, there are three parties: the data owner, the server and the user. When the data owner encrypts his/her data and the corresponding keywords, he/she can also specify the users who can retrieve it, the specific time, and the server which can perform the retrieve at the specific time. Our scheme is composed of the following algorithms:
SetupðλÞ: Input a security parameter λ, it generates the public parameters param as follows:
(1) Generate an admissible bilinear map e :
and G 2 are two multiplicative cyclic groups with the same prime order p . (2) Choose a value x 2 Z Ã p randomly, set the master's private key MSK ¼ x, and then compute the master public key MPK ¼ g x . Finally, choose the following Hash Functions: H : f0; 1g Ã → G 1 ,
server KeyGen ðparamÞ: Input param, choose ∂ 2 Z Ã p randomly as the server's private key sk s , and set the public key of the server pk s ¼ ½pk s;1 ; pk s;2 ¼ ½g ∂ ; μ 1=∂ , where g; μ 2 G 1 , then the algorithm outputs a pair of public key and private key ðpk s ; sk s Þ for the server.
user KeyGen ðparamÞ: Input the identity ID i of user i and the private key x of the master, then the algorithm sets the public key of user i pk ui ¼ H 1 ðID i Þ, and computes the user's private key sk ui ¼ x Á H 1 ðID i Þ. Finally, the algorithm outputs a pair of public key and private key ðpk ui ; sk ui Þ for user i.
T À dPEKS À param; pk uj ; w; pk s ; T Á : Firslty, input the global parameters param, the public keys pk uj ðj ¼ 1; :::; nÞ of the authorized users, the keyword w, the public key of the designated server pk s and the specific time T, then choose a number r 2 Z Ã p randomly and compute Δ ¼ Q n j¼1 H 1 ðID j Þ 2 Z Ã p , and then output the keyword ciphertext C ¼ ½C 1 ; C 2 ; C 3 ¼ ½pk r s;1 ; Δ; H 3 ðeðH 2 ðwÞ Δ Á H1ðTÞ ; g x Þ r Þ. Trapdoorðparam; sk ui ; w; pk s Þ: Input the global parameter set param, the private key of user i, the public key pk s of the server, and the keyword w. Then the algorithm chooses a random value r 1 2 Z Ã p , and computes the trapdoor T w corresponding to the keyword w for user i: T w ¼ ½T w;1 ; T w;2 ¼ ½g r1 ; H 2 ðwÞ sku i Á Hðpk r1 s;1 Þ . TestðC; sk s ; T w ; TÞ: Input ciphertext C, the private key of the designated server sk s , the time T and the trapdoor T w . The designated server uses its private key to compute T' w ¼ 
; g x Þ r Þ, the algorithm outputs 'yes'.
Security analysis
In this subsection, we will illustrate the security of our scheme by proving several claims.
Ciphertext indistinguishability
Claim 1. Our scheme is semantically secure against a chosen keyword attack in the random oracle model under the BDH assumption.
Proof.
A is supposed to be an adversary who has an advantage ε in breaking the ciphertext indistinguishability of our scheme, and A has at most q H3 chances to make Hash queries to H 3 and q T chances to make trapdoor queries(q T and q H3 are two positive numbers). We design an algorithm B which can solve the BDH problem with a probability at least ε' ¼ ε=eq T q H3 , where e is the base of the natural algorithm. Since the running time of A and B are approximately the same, so if the BDH assumption holds in G 1 and ε' is a negligible value, ε must be negligible.
Let g be a generator of G 1 , algorithm B is given with g, and μ 1 ¼ g x , μ 2 ¼ g y , μ 3 ¼ g z 2 G 1 . Its goal is to output v ¼ eðg; gÞ xyz 2 G 2 . B simulates the challenger and communicates with A as follows:
Setup : B starts by giving A the master public key MPK ¼ g x ¼ μ 1 and the public keys of the authorized users pk uj ¼ H 1 ðID j Þ, where j ¼ 1:::::n. Then B forges the server's public key and the private key in this way: B chooses t; m 2 Z Ã p randomly and lets the random value μ ¼ ðμ 3 
then it computes the public key of the server pk s ¼ ½pk s;1 ; pk s;2 ¼ ½ðg z Þm; μ 1=zm ¼ ½ðg z Þm; g t=m , and there exists an unknown value sk s ¼ z Á m.
Finally, B sends the public keys of the authorized users and the server to A. H 2 queries: A can make a query to the random oracle H 2 arbitrarily. To respond to H 2 queries, B maintains a list of tuples < w j ; h j ; a j ; c j >, which is named H 2 À list. The list is initially empty. When A queries the random oracle H 2 for a keyword w i 2 f0; 1g Ã , B responds as follows:
(1) If w i already appears in a tuple< w i ; h i ; a i ; c i > of H 2 À list, then B responds H 2 ðw i Þ ¼ h i 2 G 1 to the query. (2) Otherwise, B generates a random coin c i 2 f0; 1g, so that Pr½c
B adds the tuple < w i ; h i ; a i ; c i > to the H 2 À list and responds to A by setting H 2 ðw i Þ ¼ h i . Note that in both ways, h i is uniform over G 1 , so it is independent of A's view as required.
H 3 queries: A can query the random oracle H 3 arbitrarily. To respond to H 3 queries properly, B needs to setup and maintain a H 3 À list to store the pair < t; V >, where (1) If the query for t already appears on the H 3 À list in a tuple < t; V >, then B responds with the pair H 3 ðtÞ ¼ V 2 f0; 1g n to A. (2) Otherwise, B chooses V 2 f0; 1g n randomly, and then responds it with H 3 ðtÞ ¼ V and stores the pair < t; V > in the H 3 À list.
Trapdoor query : When A makes a query for the trapdoor of keyword w i for user j, B replies as follows:
(1) B makes H 2 À query to obtain some h i 2 G 1 , which satisfies Challenge: Firslty A generates a pair of keywords w 0 and w 1 to be challenged, then B executes the challenge as follows:
(1) B makes H 2 queries twice to obtain h 0 ;h 1 2 G 1 , such that H 2 ðw 0 Þ ¼ h 0 and H 2 ðw 1 Þ ¼ h 1 . As i 2 f0; 1g, let < w i ; h i ; a i ; c i > be the corresponding tuples in the H 2 À list. If both c 0 ¼ 1 and c 1 ¼ 1, B terminates. (2) Otherwise, since at least one of c 0 ; c 1 equals 0, B picks a b 2 f0; 1g randomly, such that c b ¼ 0. (3 :
According to the definition, C* is a valid ciphertext for w b . More trapdoor queries: A can issue trapdoor queries for a keyword w i once again, with the only constraint being w i 6 ¼ w 0 ;w 1 . B replies to the queries as before.
Output: Finally, A outputs its guess b' 2 f0; 1g, which implies the challenge ciphertext C, which is T À dPEKSðparam; pk uj ; w 0 ; pk s ; TÞ or T À dPEKSðparam;pk uj ;w 1 ;pk s ;TÞ, Then B chooses a pair ðt; vÞ randomly from H 3 À list and outputs t Next, we will analyze the probability of which B does not halt during the games. For convenience, we define three events as follows: ε 1 : B does not abort during any trapdoor queries. ε 2 : B does not abort during the challenge step. ε 3 : A does not make a query for either H 3 ðeðH 2 ðw 0 Þ ðΠ n j¼1 H1ðIDjÞÞ Á H1ðTÞ ; μ r 1 ÞÞ or H 3 ðeðH 2 ðw 1 Þ ðΠ n j¼1 H1ðIDjÞÞ Á H1ðTÞ ;μ r 1 ÞÞ
Next, we will illustrate the non-negligible probability that events ε 1 and ε 2 occur. Claim 2. The probability that B does not abort during any trapdoor queries is at least 1=e. That is: Pr½ε 1 ! 1=e.
Proof. Not to lose generality, we suppose that A will not query the trapdoor for the same keyword twice. Let w i be the i'th trapdoor query for A and < w i ; h i ; a i ; c i > be the associated entry in the H 2 À list. Based on the previously given definitions, it is easy to find that c i is independent of A's view. However, no matter c i ¼ 0 or c i ¼ 1, the distribution on H 2 ðw i Þ is the identical. Thus the query can cause B to halt with a probability at most 1=ðq T þ 1Þ. Since A can make at most q T trapdoor queries, so the probability that B does not halt during any A's trapdoor queries is at least ð1 À 1=ðq T þ 1ÞÞ qT ! 1=e.
Claim 3. The probability that B does not abort during the challenge steps is at least 1=q T . That is:
Proof. Based on the above game definition, we know that B will halt at the challenge step if A can generate w 0 ; w 1 , which satisfy the following qualifications: c 0 ¼ c 1 ¼ 1, for i ¼ 0; 1, and < w i ; h i ; a i ; c i > is the corresponding tuple in the H 2 À list. As A hasn't queried the trapdoor for w 0 ; w 1 , both c 0 and c 1 are independent of A 1 's view. Therefore, for i ¼ 0 and i ¼ 1, Pr½c i ¼ 0 ¼ 1=ðq T þ 1Þ, and those two values are independent of each other,. We have Pr½c 0 ¼ c
Thus, the probability that B will not abort is at least 1=q T .
Based on the definition as mentioned above, it is easy to know that A is not allowed to issue a trapdoor query on w 0 and w 1 , and events ε 1 and ε 2 are independent of each other, so Pr½ε 1^ε2 ! 1=eq T .
Next we will demonstrate that B can output the solution for the mentioned BDH instance with the probability being at least ε=eq T . To achieve this, we will demonstrate that A is able to issue a query for H 3 ðeðH 2 ðw b Þ Π n j¼1 H1ðIDjÞ ; μ z 1 ÞÞ with the probability being at least ε during the game.
Claim 4. Suppose in a real attacking game, A is given an authorized user's public keys pk uj , and A is going to challenge on keywords w 0 and w 1 . In the response, A is replied a challenge C ¼ ½g r ; J. Then, in the real attack game, the probability of A to initiate an H 3 query for either Proof. If ε 3 occurs, we know the bit b 2 f0; 1g, which indicates that whether C is the ciphertext of w 0 or w 1 is independent of A's view. Hence, the probability that A outputs the appropriate bit b' ¼ b is at least 1 2 . Based on the definition as mentioned before, it is easy to find that Pr½b ¼ b' À 1 2 ! ε., When Pr½:ε 3 ! 2ε, the illustration is as follows: 
H1ðIDjÞÞ Á H1ðTÞ ; μ r 1 ÞÞ is at least ε.
As we know, the probability that the value appear on the left side of a pair in H 3 À list is identical, so B is able to choose the right pair with the probability being at least 1=q H3 . Suppose B does not halt during the simulation game,B can produce the correct answer with the probability being at least ε=q H3 . As the probability that B does not abort is at least 1=eq T , the probability of B's success is at least ε=eq H3 q T .
Trapdoor indistinguishability
Claim 5. The presented scheme satisfies the trapdoor indistinguishability under the HDH assumption.
Proof. Assume there exists an adversary A 1 with an advantage ε in breaking the trapdoor indistinguishability of the proposed scheme, and A 1 can make at most q T trapdoor queries, where q T is a positive. Then, we can construct an algorithm B 1 which has an advantage ε' ¼ ε to solve the HDH problem in G 1 . B 1 inputs a ðg; g a ; g b ; ηÞ 2 G 1 and H : f0; 1g Ã → G 1 , where η is either Hðg ab Þ or a random element of G 1 . B 1 acts as the challenger and interacts with A 1 as follows:
Setup: B 1 runs SetupðλÞ to generate the global parameters param, and sets the user's public key pk ui ¼ H 1 ðID j Þ and private key sk ui ¼ x Á H 1 ðID j Þ.B 1 chooses ω; l 2 Z Ã p randomly, sets μ ¼ ðg a Þ ω and the server's public key pk s ¼ ½pk s;1 ;pk s;2 ¼ ððg a Þ l ;μ 1=al Þ ¼ ððg a Þ l ;g ω=l Þ, and there exists an unknown value ∂ according to the definition sk s ¼ ∂ ¼ al.
Trapdoor query: When A 1 issues a query for a word w i for user j, B 1 responds as follows: B 1 chooses a random value r' 2 Z Ã p , sets T Ã
p is the value selected in the setup step,and then B 1 responds toA 1 with T wi ¼ ½T Ã 1 ; T Ã 2 . Challenge: A 1 chooses between two keywords w 0 ; w 1 which he/she wishes to challenge. B 1 chooses b' 2 f0; 1g randomly, and generates T Ã wb' as follows: (2) B 1 responds with the challenge trapdoor T Ã wb' ¼ ½T Ã 1 ; T Ã 2 . Since g a ; g b ; Hðg ab Þ are uniform in G and T Ã wb' is a valid trapdoor of w b' , so in the adversary's view, it is independent of the bit b'.
Trapdoor query: A 1 can issue a trapdoor query for keyword w j . B 1 responds in the way as mentioned above.
Restriction: The only restriction is that w j 6 ¼ w 0 ; w 1 .
Output: A 1 outputs its guessb 2 f0; 1g. Ifb ¼ b', then B 1 outputs 1, which means η ¼ Hðg ab Þ, and outputs 0 otherwise. 
In this simulation, B 1 does not abort at any step, hence we can know that the overall probability of success for B 1 is the same as that of A 1 .
Comparison
To evaluate the security and performance of the proposed scheme, we compare our scheme with some similar schemes. As the proposed scheme is distributed architecture oriented, the communication cost is a critical factor for the evaluation, so we compare the sizes of the trapdoors which will be transferred via the network frequently. For a better search experience, the cost of the match operation performed by the designated server should be as cheap as possible, so we concentrate on the comparison of match operation. For simplicity, some notations are defined in Table 1 , and the overall comparison is given in Table 2 .
As shown in Table 2 [7] ; our scheme needs an exponentiation operation and a bilinear paring operation. From the above comparison, we can see that the computational cost of our scheme is the same as Rhee et al.'s [12] and less than those of other schemes [7, 14] . Although the computational cost of Boneh et al.'s scheme is less than that of ours, their scheme can not achieve the effect of trapdoor indistinguishability and designated server. Furthermore, only our scheme has the timed-release feature. Therefore, our scheme is more practical for EHRS.
Conclusion
In this paper we propose a time-aware dPEKS scheme for EHRs. Compared with previous dPEKS schemes, this scheme not only has the properties of the timed-release cryptology but also achieves a control over the user's access. We also demonstrate that our scheme possesses the ciphertext indistinguishability and trapdoor indistinguishability under the BDH and the HDH assumptions. Table 2 Comparison of security and performance.
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